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WHY A WEALTH TAX IS
DEFINITELY CONSTITUTIONAL
By John R. Brooks & David Gamage*
(Draft of January 9, 2020)

Wealth tax reform proposals are playing a major role in the 2020
presidential campaign. In particular, two leading Democratic primary
candidates—Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders—have proposed wealth
tax reforms as central components of their campaign platforms. These
candidates claim their wealth tax reforms would raise substantial revenues
from the super rich, to fund proposed new spending programs for the
middle class. However, some opponents of these wealth tax reform
proposals have claimed that a wealth tax would be unconstitutional. Other
prominent critics have argued that wealth tax reforms are probably
unconstitutional, so that, after review by the courts, the “likeliest outcome is
that a wealth tax will raise exactly zero dollars.”
1

2

These claims are wrong. More precisely, these claims are wrong
because wealth tax legislation can be drafted to comply with the strictest
interpretation of the Constitution, while still being fair and administrable.
As we will explain in this essay, properly drafted, wealth tax reform
legislation is definitely constitutional and thus capable of raising substantial
revenues to fund new spending programs for the middle class.
*

John Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; David Gamage,
Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. The authors thank Sion Bell,
Daniel Hemel, Leandra Lederman, Shruti Rana, Richard Phillips, Michael Simkovik, Kirk
Stark, Joe Thorndike, …, and other participants at the 2019 National Tax Association
Annual Conference and the 2019 UVA Invitational Tax Conference for helpful
suggestions.
1
E.g.,
https://thefederalist.com/2019/08/08/heres-elizabeth-warrens-wealth-taxcompletely-unconstitutional/;
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/memo-todemocrats-a-wealth-tax-is-unconstitutional;
https://usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/11/15/elizabeth-warren-bernie-sanders-wealthtax-plan-unconstitutional-irs-column/2577982001/.
2
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/opinion/wealth-tax-constitution.html
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Without a doubt, there are constitutional uncertainties surrounding some
wealth tax reform proposals, which is why even some progressive scholars
and activists argue that reforms should focus on shoring up the income tax
instead. These arguments tend to overlook the similar constitutional
uncertainties surrounding competing reform proposals like mark-to-market
and progressive consumption taxation. Nevertheless, it is a step too far to
claim that any of these reform proposals would be unconstitutional (at least
without qualifications about poor legislative drafting). Quite the contrary, so
long as the legislation enacting any of these options for reform is drafted
with sufficient care, all of these reform options can fit squarely within the
strictest readings of the Constitution.
3

4

This essay summarizes some of the analysis that we are in the process of
developing in much greater depth in a work in progress, and that we plan to
ultimately publish in a law review format. Because we worry that
misunderstandings about the constitutionality of wealth tax reform
proposals are currently muddying public debates, we are making this short
summary of our analysis available now so as to correct the record.
The Constitution specifies two paths for assessing a new federal tax. As
3

If the 16th Amendment is to be interpreted narrowly, then either or both of mark-tomarket reform proposals and cash-flow progressive consumption tax reform proposals
could be held to be direct taxes that would need to follow the apportionment path in order
to be constitutionally valid, which raises essentially the same issues as with our discussion
of a new federal wealth tax in the body of this essay. Indeed, a least one notable scholar has
recently argued that both mark-to-market reforms and cash-flow progressive consumption
tax reforms should be held to the same standards as wealth tax reforms (Erik Jensen). If the
Supreme Court is inclined to interpret the 16th Amendment narrowly, to exclude wealth tax
reforms, we thus think it likely that the Supreme Court would also be inclined to exclude
mark-to-market reforms and possibly also cash-flow progressive consumption tax reforms.
With respect to mark-to-market reforms in particular, part of the question is whether
existing Supreme Court precedent interpreting the 16th Amendment requires something like
realization in order to distinguish income from wealth. Macomber; Glenshaw Glass. While
the Internal Revenue Code already uses accrual taxation in narrow circumstances (OID,
475), comprehensive mark-to-market could potentially raise new and different issues. To
be clear, we do not agree with this view. But a Supreme Court that would strike down a
wealth tax very well could agree.
4
By this, we mean that there is no reasonable reading of the Constitution that could
support striking down a properly drafted version of these reforms. We cannot completely
guarantee that the Supreme Court might not go rogue and disingenuously rule against the
plain text of the Constitution and prior precedents; but we think it exceedingly unlikely that
the Supreme Court would go rogue to that extent, and a Supreme Court inclined to go
rogue to that extent might potentially strike down any piece of legislation no matter how
sound its constitutionality (including, inter alia, alternative income tax reforms).
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we will explain, a wealth tax reform can be drafted so as follow either of
these paths, and then fallback clauses can be drafted to cope with the
uncertainty about which of these paths the Supreme Court might rule a
wealth tax must follow in order to be constitutional. In that way, the
legislation can be constitutional regardless of which path the Supreme Court
demands.
The first path applies to “[indirect] taxes,” “duties, imposts, and
excises,” and “income taxes.” This path requires that the federal tax be
uniform. That is, the federal tax rates must be the same in every state. All
current federal taxes follow this path, which we will call the “uniformity
path.”
5

6

7

The second path applies to “direct taxes.” This path requires that the
federal tax be apportioned, rather than that it be uniform. That is, the
federal tax must raise the same revenue per capita from every state. Because
some states have wealthier populations, this path would require that federal
wealth tax rates be set lower in wealthier states and higher in less-wealthy
states. We will call this path the “apportionment path.”
8

Constitutional and tax scholars disagree about which of these paths
should apply to a new federal wealth tax. Many have made strong
arguments that a comprehensive wealth tax is not a “direct tax,” and
therefore should be uniform, rather than apportioned. Our view is that, even
if a comprehensive wealth tax would have been a “direct tax” at the
founding, the 16 Amendment should be interpreted broadly to encompass
wealth tax reforms—as well as encompassing mark-to-market reforms,
progressive consumption tax reforms, and other reform proposals designed
to assess tax based on comprehensive measurements of ability to pay. In
essence, this is because the lines between what is “income” and what is
“wealth” (and, for that matter, what is “consumption”) are fluid and
contingent, and it is likely impossible to give Congress the tools it needs to
tax income without also thereby giving it the tools to tax wealth or other
measures of ability to pay. In contrast, the doctrines and interpretive tools
that courts would use to prohibit wealth taxation would end up also severely
9

th

10

5

U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 1.
7
16th Amendment
8
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 2, cl. 3.
9
E.g., Bruce Ackerman, Calvin Johnson, Dawn Johnsen, Walter Dellinger, Joseph
Dodge, Erik Jensen, etc.
10
Our view builds on prior work by Ari Glogower, among others.
6
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undermining income taxation. Under this view, the Supreme Court’s
necessary deference to Congress in applying the 16 Amendment to the
federal income tax also authorizes a uniform federal wealth tax.
th

However, we cannot predict with any confidence whether the Supreme
Court would agree with our views on this question. The jurisprudence on
direct taxes—nearly all of which occurred in the 19 century—is admittedly
confusing and sometimes contradictory. And the history and interpretation
of the 16 Amendment is also disputed, with some scholars saying it was
clearly intended to overrule Pollock, and others disagreeing. The Supreme
Court has simply not provided sufficient indication in the past as to how it
would rule on the question of whether a new federal wealth tax would need
to be designed in accordance with the uniformity path or the apportionment
path. This is why there are constitutional uncertainties surrounding wealth
tax reforms, and why we propose that a new federal wealth tax should be
designed first to follow the uniformity path (in accordance with our view as
to how the Supreme Court should rule), but then with fallback clauses
specifying as a backup option how the new federal wealth tax would be
redesigned to follow the apportionment path in case the Supreme Court
were to rule that this is the required route.
11

th

th

12

Designing a federal wealth tax to follow the uniformity path is the easier
route, apart from constitutionality concerns. All existing federal taxes were
designed in accordance with the uniformity path, and this is thus the path
that Congress, scholars, and the public are the most familiar with. All that is
required to design a federal wealth tax in accordance with the uniformity
path is for the wealth tax to assess the same tax rates in every state and
geographic region, just like we do for the federal income tax.
11

Consider that Bruce Ackerman, a leading advocate of the position that a wealth tax
should be constitutional under the uniformity path, recently concluded an essay written to
refute arguments by Daniel Hemel and Rebecca Kysar as to why a wealth tax would “very
likely” need to instead be designed to follow the apportionment path, with “Nobody can
say how [the Supreme Court will rule as to a new federal wealth tax. . . .] Sorry, but my
crystal ball clouds over at this point.”; https://prospect.org/justice/why-are-liberaldemocrats-leading-the-constitutional-campa/
12
In addition to our view that the 16th Amendment should be interpreted broadly to
encompass wealth tax reforms, a number of other scholars have argued on different, but
related, grounds for why a new federal wealth tax should be constitutional if designed in
accordance with the uniformity path. See, e.g., Ackerman, Johnson, Johnsen & Dellinger.
But other scholars have disputed these conclusions, arguing that a new federal wealth tax
would only be constitutional if designed in accordance with the apportionment path, see,
e.g., Dodge, Jensen. Importantly, there are no scholarly arguments concluding that a federal
wealth tax would be unconstitutional under both paths; rather, the debate has been entirely
about which path a new federal wealth tax would need to follow.
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Yet it is also possible to design a federal wealth tax in accordance with
the apportionment path. Although this route would be somewhat more
complicated than following the uniformity path, these extra complexities
are relatively minor and readily manageable as compared to other issues
involved in designing a major new federal tax reform.
13

Consider that, between 1798 and 1861, Congress five times levied direct
taxes designed to follow the apportionment path. These direct taxes were
not comprehensive wealth taxes, but instead were taxes on specified forms
of wealth, such as real estate (and slaves). The first four of these direct taxes
worked reasonably well. But the fifth—the Direct Tax of 1861—created
numerous problems. The reason was the Civil War.
14

Scholars disagree about why the founders wrote the apportionment
requirement for direct taxes into the Constitution. One view is that this was
all about protecting slavery from being taxed more than other forms of
wealth. (The scholars who take this view generally conclude that a federal
wealth tax should be authorized under the uniformity path, as the 13
Amendment has mooted the issues related to taxing slavery.) But other
scholars argue that the apportionment requirement was meant to serve a
broader state sovereignty purpose—beyond just protecting slavery—and
thus conclude that a federal wealth tax could only be authorized following
the apportionment path. Perhaps the leading advocate of this view argues
that the goal behind the apportionment requirement for direct taxes was for
state governments to be able to act as a buffer between state residents and
direct federal taxes by tying direct tax liabilities to representation.
th

Regardless of the founders’ intentions, this institutional arrangement of
allowing state governments to act as a buffer between taxpayers and the
federal government’s direct taxing power proved rather problematic at a
time when some state governments were in open revolt. Consequently,
although the Direct Tax of 1861 was largely successful in raising revenues
from the Union states, questions of what to do about taxpayers in the
Confederate states created lingering controversy. As a result, this historical
15

13

For some early thoughts by one of us on some of the other, relatively less minor,
issues involved in designing a new federal wealth tax, see David Gamage, Five Key
Research Findings on Wealth Taxation for the Super Rich, available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427827.
14
For discussion, see, e.g., Charles F. Dunbar, The Direct Tax of 1861, 3 QUARTERLY
J. OF ECON. 436 (1889); John Joseph Wallis; A History of the Property Tax in America.
15
For elaboration, see Joseph J. Thondike, Tax History: Federal Wealth Taxes Have a
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episode “effectively discredited” direct taxes, and Congress has not
seriously considered levying a direct tax since 1861.
16

However, modern tools of tax administration and fiscal federalism
would make it much easier to levy an apportioned direct tax today. Before
we explain why, we should acknowledge that our contributions on this topic
build on prior work by John Plecnik, who has previously argued for one
possible approach for designing a federal wealth tax in a manner that he
argues would satisfy the apportionment requirement.
17

Plecnik’s approach would involve the federal government levying a
uniform federal-level wealth tax—with the same federal tax rates in every
state—but with the federal government then immediately refunding to the
taxpayers the amount needed to have the total revenue collected satisfy the
apportionment requirement. State governments would then be allowed or
encouraged to enact “pick-up” taxes, which would essentially confiscate the
amounts of these refunds. If state governments fully used this power, the
end result for taxpayers would be the same as paying a single-rate wealth
tax, but with that total tax revenue split between state and federal tax rates.
18

Long and Uneasy History, 165 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 1264 (NOV. 25, 2019).
16
Dunbar, at 461.
17
John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest Proposal For A Constitutionally
Apportioned Wealth Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483 (2014).
18
To elaborate the brief explanation in the text above, Plecnik’s approach would begin
by levying a single, national federal wealth tax rate in each state. Then, Plecnick’s
approach would have the federal government keep only a portion of the wealth tax
revenues raised from each state, an amount calculated by multiplying each state’s
population by the per-capita wealth tax revenues raised in the state with the smallest percapita wealth tax base. The rest would be refunded to the taxpayers, in proportion to their
tax payments. Thus, all of the revenues raised in the state with the smallest per-capita
wealth tax base would remain with the federal government, whereas much of the revenues
raised in states with larger per-capita wealth tax bases would be refunded to taxpayers.
Plecnick then proposes allowing or encouraging states to claim those refunds through a
state-level “pick-up” tax, similar to the pre-EGTRRA credit for state estate taxes under
I.R.C. § 2011. If states exercised that ability fully, then taxpayers would be in the same
circumstances as if the federal government had just kept all the initial tax payments.
Plecnik argues that the end result would be a uniform combined wealth tax rate – that
is, the same combined rate levied in every state – but with states differing in how much of
the revenue from that combined rate tax goes to the the federal government (as opposed to
the state government). As Plecnik explains, “[t]his approach is not only horizontally
equitable as between taxpayers in different states, but it complies with the letter and spirit
of the Apportionment Clause. It complies with the letter of the law, because each state pays
no more than its apportioned share to the federal government. In addition, this approach
complies with the spirit of the law because no state is enriched at another's expense. . . .
Thus, there is no realistic concern that federal and state “pick up” wealth taxes would be
collapsed as one through the substance-over-form or step transaction doctrines. There is
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Although we applaud Plecnik’s thinking on this issue and, indeed, we
build on his contributions in this essay, we ultimately think that Plecnik’s
proposals are not the best way to design an apportioned federal wealth tax.
One issue with Plecnik’s approach is that it would raise only limited
revenues for the federal government, because much of the revenues raised
by the combined state- and federal-level wealth tax rates would go to state
governments.
Thus, Plecnik’s approach could perhaps work reasonably well if the
primary goal of a new federal wealth tax were to address distributional
concerns or to help fund state government spending programs, rather than
raising substantial new federal revenues. But, even then, his approach
depends on state governments choosing to enact a pick-up tax to fully
collect the federal refunds. Plecnik claims state governments would do so in
order to seize a source of free revenue (and if not, that the federal
government could use some sticks and carrots to encourage them to do so).
But the politics are still questionable—that revenue is hardly “free.”
Wealthy taxpayers in poor states exert disproportionate power, and it is
quite likely that they would strongly resist a perceived state-level wealth tax
on top of a federal tax if it resulted in them paying a greater share of their
wealth in total taxes compared to the wealth in neighboring states.
19

For this reason, we prefer a somewhat different approach for designing
a new federal wealth tax to follow the apportionment path. Our approach
would begin with Congress first legislating the desired nationwide annual
revenue targets for the new tax. The apportionment requirement would
then result in different state-specific federal wealth tax rates, with these
state-specific federal rates being set lower in wealthier states and higher in
20

nothing unconstitutional or untoward about a state leveling direct taxes without
apportionment; the states have done so throughout history and they continue to do so
through various property taxes.” Plecnik at 514-15.
19
Indeed, David Hasen has praised Plecnik’s proposals for this reason. David Hasen,
Accretion-Based Progressive Wealth Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 277, 304-05 (2017).
20
For any given estimate of the nationwide wealth tax base, the desired nationwide
annual revenue targets are mechanically equivalent to the desired nationwide average tax
rates (which is presumably what Congress would specify for a uniform federal wealth tax).
That is, a nationwide revenue target could be calculated by multiplying the desired
nationwide average federal tax rates by the CBO’s estimate of the nationwide wealth tax
base for each year. In this manner, the tax rates specified for a uniform federal wealth tax
could be converted into revenue targets for an apportioned federal wealth tax that could
operate as a fallback option in case the Supreme Court strikes down the uniform federal
wealth tax.
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less-wealthy states. In other words, in contrast to Plecnik’s proposal, the
enacted federal wealth tax would be apportioned in the first instance, with
non-uniform rates across the states.
21

22

We think that the best approach for implementing the apportionment
requirement – so as to set lower state-specific federal tax rates in wealthier
states and higher state-specific federal tax rates in less-wealthy states –
would be to follow a variation on the methods used by the Direct Tax Act of
1813. The 1813 Act had the Committee of Ways and Means set countyspecific tax rates for every county in each state; however, for a modern
implementation of this approach, it would probably be better to delegate the
task of setting the annual tax rates to the Treasury Department or the IRS
23

24

21

As an intermediate step, the nationwide annual revenue targets could be divided into
separate revenue quotas for each state, with the revenue quotas apportioned on a per-capita
basis. State-specific wealth tax rates could then be calculated based on the estimates of the
rates needed to meet each state’s revenue quota.
22
An alternative approach that would also be viable would be to begin with uniform
federal-level wealth tax rates, and then have the Treasury Department calculate partial
rebates to be provided to taxpayers in wealthier states so as to satisfy the apportionment
requirement. However, unless the uniform federal-level wealth tax rates were set equal to
the rates needed in the least wealthy state (such that taxpayers in every other state would
receive partial rebates) this approach would raise less revenue for the federal government.
We thus think it is somewhat simpler and more straightforward to begin with different,
state-specific federal tax rates, as we explain above.
23
See Dunbar, at 441-44.
24
So long as the delegation instructions are clear and sufficiently precise, there should
not be any non-delegation doctrine issues involved in delegating the setting of statespecific federal tax rates to Treasury or the IRS. Indeed, Congress already delegates to the
IRS the task of annually adjusting federal income tax brackets to account for inflation, for
example. Delegating the task of annually setting the state-specific federal wealth tax rates
in accordance with the apportionment requirement could work similarly.
That said, a concern arises (and we thank Daniel Hemel for bringing this concern to
our attention) that it is at least theoretically possible that some less-wealthy states might
lack a sufficient tax base of wealthy taxpayers subject to the federal wealth tax for the
state-specific federal tax rates in these states to be set high enough to satisfy the
apportionment requirement. To address this concern, we recommend that the enacting
legislation specify a maximum cap on the state-specific federal wealth tax rates (say 10%).
If these maximum rates would not suffice to raise sufficient funds in any less-wealthy state
to satisfy the apportionment requirement, then we recommend that the enacting legislation
further specify a back-up residual tax that would go into effect in those states, similar to the
approach used in the Direct Tax Act of 1798. (The 1978 Act levied uniform federal tax
rates on houses and slaves, along with a residual tax on land within each state, with the
amount of the residual tax owed within each state calculated separately “as a residual after
the amount of tax derived from the first two categories was subtracted” so as to satisfy the
overall apportionment requirement for direct taxes. Judith Green Watson, A Discovery:
1798
Federal
Direct
Tax
Records
for
Connecticut,
available
at
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2007/spring/tax-lists.html. See also Davis
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and to only set state-specific tax rates rather than county-specific tax rates.
In any case, the apportionment requirement would be satisfied by setting
different, state-specific federal wealth tax rates in each state, with these
rates being set lower in wealthier states and higher in less-wealthy states.
25

26

On its own, this might seem inequitable. But consider that, for the
existing U.S. income tax, combined federal- and state-level rates already
differ amongst the states. For instance, the highest capital gains tax rate is
currently 13.3 percentage points higher in California than in Florida.
R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States at 109-110).
There are several potential ways to design this residual tax, and we will explore them
in our longer work. As illustration, one possibility is for the base of this residual tax to be
all property within each applicable state that is subject to that state’s property tax laws and
that is valued above a specified threshold by that state’s property tax system. For instance,
the threshold could be set at $1M, so that all property valued at over $1M would be subject
to the residual tax, but with the residual tax rate applying only to the valuation amounts in
excess of that $1M threshold. The state-specific rate of this residual tax would be set at
whatever level is needed to raise the additional revenues required to satisfy the
apportionment requirement for each applicable state, to the extent that this is needed after
capping the state-specific federal wealth tax rates. If desired, the enacting legislation could
also offer state governments the option of raising these residual funds from some other
method, similar to the options provided to state governments under the Direct Tax Acts of
1813 through 1816; see Thorndike.
This approach for designing the residual tax has appeal because every state already has
a property tax, and so no new valuation rules or other base-definition rules would be
needed for a federal residual tax designed to piggyback on existing state property tax
systems. By contrast, other possible approaches for designing a residual federal direct tax
would be more complicated, because there are no existing federal direct taxes to piggyback
on and no other existing state level direct taxes with sufficiently broad bases that are levied
in every state.
25
Indeed, the Direct Tax Act of 1815 abandoned the 1813 Act’s approach of
apportioning at the county level, and instead apportioned at the state level, like we
recommend. Dewey at 141 (“These taxes were apportioned among the States on the census
of 1810, and the first act [the 1813 Act] went so far as to apportion to each county in the
several States the amount it should pay, thereby creating great inequities. To avoid this evil
the second act [the 1815 Act] did not attempt to apportion the quotas among the counties . .
. . In view of the infrequent attempts throughout our history to levy a direct tax, it is
suggestive to note that the several assessments made upon the States were met with a fair
degree of exactitude and promptness. If there was an unequal incidence, there was little
grumbling, thus showing the distinct advance from the disastrous policy of requisitions
under the Confederacy.”)
26
It is worth noting that one possible advantage of both Plecnik’s proposal and the
alternative we discuss in note 23, supra, is that it would be somewhat simpler
administratively to assure proper apportionment, because the rebates would be based on the
amount of revenue actually raised, rather than an ex ante estimate of the wealth tax base in
each state. However, seeing at the Direct Tax Acts of 1813 and 1815 calculated the statespecific tax rates needed for apportionment based on ex ante estimates of the wealth tax
base, we do not view this as a substantial obstacle.
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Because all existing federal taxes follow the uniformity path, federal-level
tax rates are currently set the same in every state, with state-level piggyback
taxes then making the combined tax rates unequal. Yet, in our federal
system, what ultimately matters to taxpayers isn’t the rate levied by just one
level of government, but rather the overall combined state-and-federal-level
rate. Therefore, we can make our apportioned wealth tax fair—that is,
sufficiently uniform—by combining it with state-level credits or rebates
facilitated by federal block grants provided to state governments through a
fiscal equalization program.
Congress could implement this through two steps. First, Congress could
streamline state governments’ ability to levy piggyback taxes, credits, or
rebates for the new wealth tax. (This is already being done with the existing
income tax, which is why state-level income taxes use relatively simple
forms based on information from the federal-level returns.) Thus, the lesswealthy states could just allow a credit against their own taxes for any
“excess” wealth tax paid to the federal government, thus leaving taxpayers
with uniform overall rates.
Second, Congress could implement a fiscal equalization system to
ensure that the governments of less-wealthy states have sufficient funds to
rebate the combined wealth tax rates down to the nationwide average levels,
to the extent that these state governments opt to do so. To achieve this, the
enacting legislation could specify that the state-specific tax rates set for the
wealthiest state be set equal to the rates Congress would have desired for a
uniform federal wealth tax, so that the state-specific rates would then be set
higher in every state other than the wealthiest. Then, Congress would take
the “extra” revenue raised from each state (except the wealthiest) and send
it back to each state’s government as a block grant. This would give every
state’s government the extra revenues needed to fund state tax credits,
thereby reducing the combined federal- and state-level wealth tax rates
down to the level specified for the wealthiest state—the level that Congress
would have desired for a uniform federal wealth tax.
27

Whereas Plecnik’s proposal arguably satisfies the apportionment
requirement, our approach clearly satisfies the apportionment requirement
and should thus reduce the constitutional risk to nil (at least assuming the
27

This need not be done as part of the legislation enacting the wealth tax. Congress
could alternatively wait to see how the Supreme Court rules and only legislate a fiscal
equalization system if the Supreme Court ultimately holds that the wealth tax needs to be
apportioned, with the fiscal equalization system then being enacted through subsequent
legislation following such a Supreme Court decision.
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legislation is well drafted). This is because, under our approach, the federal
wealth tax would be apportioned in the first instance, rather than only after
combining it with refunds. Because our proposed fiscal equalization
program would then channel excess revenues to state governments, rather
than to taxpayers, the Apportionment Clause would not be implicated.
Then, our approach would ask state governments to credit or rebate the
extra federal funds received to the states’ taxpayers, rather than asking that
state governments affirmatively levy what might be considered new taxes.
Thus, the wealthy taxpayers that might attempt to block the new state-level
pick-up taxes under Plecnik’s proposal should instead be the strongest
supporters of using the revenues that state governments would receive from
the federal government under our proposal to fund state-level credits or
rebates. At the same time, because it is ultimately up to each state’s
government whether to credit, it would be virtually impossible for a court to
combine all the possibilities when testing for apportionment.
28

Our proposed fiscal equalization step may sound complicated at first.
But consider that fiscal equalization systems of this sort already exist in
Canada, Australia, and other federal nations, and have been proposed for
the United States. Moreover, existing federal grants to state governments,
such as through Medicaid and Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, already operate as a form of fiscal equalization, and
“General Revenue Sharing” under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act
of 1972 made unrestricted grants directly to states and municipalities based
in part on income and need, prior to its repeal under President Reagan. It
would thus be relatively straightforward for Congress to implement a new
29

30

28

Because the fiscal equalization funds would be granted to the governments of the
less-wealthy states, rather than the taxpayers within those states, leaving it up to the
discretion of each state’s government whether and to what extent to rebate those funds to
the taxpayers within each state, we think it exceedingly unlikely that the Supreme Court
would rule that our proposed approach would not satisfy the apportionment requirement.
That said, we are not completely confident that there is no plausible reading of the
Constitution that might support the Supreme Court ruling that our proposed fiscal
equalization program might violate the apportionment clause when combined with
apportioned federal wealth tax rates. To address this possibility, enacting legislation could
also include severance instructions that would drop out the fiscal equalization system,
while retaining the rest of the wealth tax, were the Supreme Court to so rule. To address
the inequities that such a ruling could cause (in the exceedingly unlikely event of the Court
ruling in this manner), Congress could then subsequently implement an independent fiscal
equalization system (of the sort we have proposed) in new legislation following such a
Supreme Court decision.
29
See Kirk J. Stark, Rich States, Poor States: Assessing the Design and Effect of a
U.S. Fiscal Equalization Regime, 63 TAX L. REV. 957 (2010).
30
http://www.jct.gov/s-1-73.pdf

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3518506
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3489997

12

Definitely Constitutional

[10-Jan-20

fiscal equalization system as part of enacting an apportioned federal wealth
tax. This would provide less-wealthy state governments the funds needed to
rebate their residents’ wealth tax burdens down to the desired nationwide
average levels.
Ultimately, it would be up to each state’s government to decide how
much of a rebate to offer to the state’s taxpayers, or even whether to instead
levy an additional state-level piggyback tax. Thus, just as wealthy
Californians currently face higher overall capital gains tax rates as
compared to wealthy Floridians, different state governments might make
different choices with respect to a new apportioned wealth tax, resulting in
the wealthy residents of some states having higher tax burdens than others.
But this is a natural consequence of the constitutional structure of our fiscal
federation, wherein the federal government has limited powers to infringe
on state governments’ fiscal domains. The precise nature of how the
federal government must act in deference to state government’s fiscal
discretion is somewhat different for apportioned taxes than for uniform
taxes—which results in the need for a fiscal equalization system to achieve
equity for an apportioned federal wealth tax and not for a uniform federal
wealth tax. But the broader picture remains the same: the Constitution
protects state governments’ fiscal discretion from undue infringement by
the federal government’s taxing powers. Accordingly, our proposal is
consistent not only with the text of the Constitution, but also with the
balancing of federal and state fiscal interests that the Apportionment Clause
represents.
31

32

We have thus explained how Congress could legislate a federal wealth
tax that would definitely survive scrutiny under either the uniformity or the
apportionment path. But, then, what to do about the fact that we do not yet
know how the Supreme Court would rule as to which of these paths a new
federal wealth tax would need to follow?
The solution here is fallback clauses. Both the structure of the
Constitution and prior Supreme Court precedent are absolutely clear that
Congress can write instructions for what is to happen if portions of
legislation are held unconstitutional. The only challenges are that Congress
must write such instructions unambiguously and the fallback options must
31

See David Gamage and Darien Shanske, The Federal Government’s Power to
Restrict State Taxation, 81 STATE TAX NOTES 547 (2016).
32
Id.; see also David Gamage and Darien Shanske, Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal
Federalism in the United States, 111 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 295, 35369 (2017).
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themselves be constitutional. For a new federal wealth tax, this means that
Congress should write instructions clearly specifying that if the wealth tax
is held to be unconstitutional under the uniformity path then a modified
version of the wealth tax designed in accordance with the apportionment
path should then go into effect.
33

Drafting these instructions into legislation would involve some
additional challenges beyond what we can explain here. But the overall task
is very manageable in the context of designing a major new tax reform. The
bottom line is that carefully drafted federal wealth tax legislation would be
definitely – without any doubt – constitutional.

33

See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 735-36; Tom Campbell, Severability of
Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495 (2011); Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 303 (2007).
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